Abstract
INTRODUCTION
The nature of effective board functioning and the role of board directors have been considered as being among the most important areas of management research (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) .
Such concerns have been examined in the corporate governance literature highlighting the importance of board effectiveness in terms of the success of a company and the role that each board director plays in contributing to effective board and organisational performance (Renton, 1999) . Developing a shared vision for the future of the company, enhancing quality relationships and establishing clear and open communication between board members are considered as particularly important indicators of a high performing board (Coulson-Thomas, 1991; Willcocks, 1994; Renton, 1999; Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001 ).
Concern over board performance and effectiveness is reinforced in the context of international joint ventures (IJVs). IJVs are viewed as hybrid configurations and due to the particular challenges in managing such entities, it has been argued that board directors play a crucial role in IJV development (Child, 1998) . IJV partners' representation on the joint venture entity board of directors is not only reflective of the equity ownership of the organisation (Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1988; Kumar and Seth, 1998; Sharma, 1998; Carver, 2000) , but also acts as a mechanism for representing partners interests and ensuring positive relationships on the board Doz and Hamel, 1998; Garrow et al, 2000) , both viewed as preconditions for IJV success (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Inkpen, 1995; Antoniou and Whitman, 1998; Wang et al., 1999) .
Numerous studies emphasise the importance of board director contribution to the success of an IJV (Carver, 2000) . However, it is viewed that insufficient attention in the IJV field has focused on IJV boards from the perspective of the role and contribution of individual directors.
Thus, in considering IJV board dynamics and the ways in which directors of IJV boards contribute to board effectiveness, this paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature on IJV governance, with particular focus on IJV boards and top teams. Attention is given to studies that directly concentrate on an IJV director's role in order to reveal empirical evidence regarding the IJV board director's contribution to board and organisational performance. The paper concludes by identifying further avenues of research covering IJV board and director role and contribution and how such research can be pursued.
IJV BOARDS
The focus of this review of the IJV literature concentrates on studies that highlight IJV board roles, composition and dynamics, the latter including IJV board decision-making issues, boardroom agendas, frequency of board meetings, as well as the impact of the national and organisational culture on IJV directors contribution to board performance. Two studies in particular (Bjorkman, 1995; Goodall and Warner, 2002) focus on IJV board relations (Table 1) from the perspective of corporate governance considerations in Sino-foreign IJVs. The research by Bjorkman (1995) takes an expatriate (Western partner's) perspective where board data is collected from senior managers who were affected by board decisions, rather than from board members. In contrast Goodall and Warner's (2002) research is one of the first to shed light on IJV board processes from the perspective of senior Chinese managers experience of IJV board interactions and decision outcomes.
Other studies, presented in Table 1 , draw heavily on the literature concerning IJV control and inter-partner relationships. The former treaties mainly consider board/top team composition as a control mechanism, whereas the latter group study the IJV top team issues and dynamics from a variety of perspectives. However, none of these studies focus on IJV board behaviour and strategic decision processes but rather consider the structural dimensions of boards.
Consequently, most empirical studies in the IJV literature provide scant information on IJV board roles, composition, characteristics and dynamics. Thus IJV board size, director tenure, as well as the frequency of IJV board meetings, IJV boardroom agendas and board decisionmaking issues remain virtually unexplored. Slightly greater attention is paid to IJV top management team (TMT) issues and processes, such as communication and decision-making processes that impact on the functioning of boards and TMTs in IJVs (Pearce, 1997; Li et al, 1999; Hambrick et al, 2001) and by implication shed light on appropriate IJV director behaviour (Li et al, 2002) . 
IJV Board Roles
In their study of corporate governance in Sino-foreign IJVs, Goodall and Warner (2002) indicate that board functions within Sino-foreign IJVs are influenced by a variety of demographic factors, such as, the age of the IJV; financial performance; number of Chinese and foreign partners; nationality of the foreign partner and the geographic location of the IJV.
Similar to Bjorkman's (1995) Apart from Bjorkman's (1995) and Goodall and Warner's (2002) research, those few studies that focus on ownership and the control structure of IJVs only "partly" explore the IJV board's role. One in particular is that of Yan and Gray's (1994) study of bargaining power, management control and performance of the US-Chinese IJVs, where some attention is given to the importance of the role played by boards of directors in making strategic decisions on behalf of the IJV and solving critical problems regarding the partnership. They find that in most circumstances, boards of directors are empowered to discuss and take action on all fundamental issues concerning the joint venture. These include expansion projects, production and business programmes, the budget, distribution of profits, plans concerning manpower and pay scales, the termination of business, the appointment of the president, the vice-president(s), the chief engineer, the treasurer and the auditors, as well as board functions and powers and director remuneration Gray, 1994:1493) .
Additionally, Groot and Merchant (2000) examine the control practices employed by the partners of IJVs and find that, in terms of IJV contracts, the board plays a significant actionand results-control role. Their action-control role involves either making or approving all major financing, investment and personnel decisions, whereas the results-control role involves monitoring their IJV's performance on a regular basis and accordingly initiating change (Groot and Merchant, 2000) . In one of the IJVs under their consideration, the primary function of the board is to review and approve the strategic plan and annual budget, to approve all appointments of personnel to management positions, as well as all investment proposals. In another, in the IJV agreement, certain strategic decisions required unanimous IJV board agreement.
In addition to approving the IJV's business plan, profit distribution, major investments and other important financial decisions, the IJV board has been found to be a "major forum" for conflict resolution, decision-making, co-ordination of activities and strategic debate (Goodall and Warner, 2002) . Accordingly, Hambrick et al (2001) maintain that IJV boards are a major conduit for relationship development and enhancement between the IJV, the TMT and their parent organisations. In Daniels and Magill's (1993) study, IJV TMT members refer to the board of directors for policy and other key decisions, and are appraised by the IJV board members. The authors (Daniels and Magill, 1993; Kumar and Seth, 1998 ) also recognise that a critical aspect of the role and contribution of the IJV board is to act as a communication and information-processing channel between the parents and the IJV or, as Shenkar and Zeira (1992:71) refer to the IJV boards central "buffering function".
IJV Board Composition
Studies concerning IJV board composition broadly conclude that the percentage of equity ownership of the partners of the IJV is reflected in the appointment of directors (Chalos, 1998) .
In effect, a parent's equity share directly affects representation on the IJV board in terms of the number of IJV directors the parent company is entitled to appoint relative to the total size of the board (Child and Yan, 1999) . The contractual agreement specifies the IJV board's structure particularly in terms of equity partner representation on the IJV board of directors (Zeira and Shenkar, 1990; Garrow et al, 2000) . An exception is the board in one of the IJVs examined by Groot and Merchant (2000) , where all but one member of the board were local IJV employees who did not represent either of the two parents.
In their study of Australian-Indian IJVs, As-Saber et al (1998) highlight that in almost all the IJVs studied the CEOs were not members of the board of directors. The reason for this is the lack of incentive for CEOs to serve as board members due to Indian law regulations not permitting a full-time board member to hold a full-time management position in the company and to receive simultaneous compensation for both positions (As-Saber et al, 1998) . What is not clear, not only in As-Saber et al's (1998) study but also in a number of other studies in the field, is whether the IJV board studied was a single or a two-tier board 1 . Regarding board size, Goodall and Warner's (2002) study shows that the number of IJV board members varies considerably -the smallest board having four members and the largest having eleven.
IJV Board Dynamics
A number of factors influencing IJV board dynamics are considered, including decision making on the board particularly related to multiple task environments and decision making power, as well as factors important for board effectiveness -namely, openness of communication, quality of relationships, trust, shared vision and the effect of directors' tenure on board and individual director performance. Frequency of meetings, board agendas and the impact of the national and organisational culture have also been scrutinised.
Decision Making
Decision-making on the board is identified as a complicated issue because of the conflicting expectations of at least three different task environments, the two partners and their IJV, which require synchronisation of different objectives, beliefs and attitudes towards the decision process (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987) . Decision processes and director interventions can become dysfunctional if the IJV goals stated in the documents of incorporation are viewed as ambiguous (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987) . Therefore, in examining decision making on IJV boards, multiple viewpoints need to be considered when formulating business policies and making strategic decisions. The reason is that IJVs are influenced by the policies, value systems and managerial practices of their parent companies and problems may arise as a result of conflicting partner values regarding IJV goals and strategy. Factors that intensify the tensions inhibiting collaboration between IJV board members themselves and the IJV board and its parents are differences of working styles, values, attitudes and beliefs, which originate from the national and corporate cultures of the parent companies involved (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999) . Consequently, at IJV board level, differences in priorities and values emerge resulting in confusion, frustration and slowness of decision making (Glaister, 1995:79) .
Such tensions are exacerbated by the fact that the composition of the IJV board of directors has been utilised as one effective way of controlling the risks associated with opportunistic partner behaviour in the IJV and ensuring that all partner's interests are being protected (Yan & Gray, 1994; Luo et al, 2001) . One approach to risk reduction lies in the power of IJV boards of directors to select the senior managers of the enterprise (Bjorkman, 1995; Wang et al., 1999; Bjorkman and Lu, 1999) , an important consideration in terms of ensuring strategic control (Child and Yan, 1999) . Equally, a number of authors concur that influencing the staffing of an IJV's top management represents a crucial strategic control mechanism for an IJV parent, particularly in terms of staffing the IJV's TMT by managers from the parent company (Schaan, 1988; Geringer and Hebert, 1989; Geringer and Frayne, 1990; Kumar and Seth, 1998) .
However, on the positive side, directors and senior managers of the IJV are likely to be relatively well positioned to generate essential resources if they have prior experience and are networked into the parent company (Kumar and Seth, 1998:581) .
Other studies (Geringer, 1993; Goodall and Warner, 2002) emerge with contrasting conclusions especially over degrees of strategic influence and decision power and the fact that they are not simply a function of equity share. In a study of ownership and control in EastWest IJVs, Geringer (1993) found that having a majority on the board can be relatively unimportant, as in many instances major decisions of the IJV board tend to be reached through consensus. If a parent attempts to force its will upon its partners merely based on relative ownership, then the IJV's prospects for long-term survival diminish (Geringer, 1993:209) .
Although the exercise of asymmetric power can enhance the more powerful parent's IJV goal attainment, the less powerful parent can resent such unwelcome influence (Yan and Gray, 1994; Li et al, 2002) . As Yan and Gray (2001:409) state: "If decisions are made by the board of directors by simple majority rule, then inter-partner competitive motives will likely drive decisions that mirror the pattern of power distribution between the partners." Further, control at board level is not simply a matter of votes but the ability to influence other board members on important issues (Schaan, 1988) . As a result, studies have shown that minority partners have an opportunity to influence the management of the IJV if they are careful to appoint, as their board representatives, people with a strong grasp of the IJV's strategic circumstances and who also have sound bargaining skills and empathy for the partner's culture (Schaan, 1988) .
Board Effectiveness and Director Tenure
Viewed from a more "positive" perspective, it has been argued that inter-partner trust in the IJV will affect the quality of relationships between the partners and the perceived importance of the formal governance (control) structure (Yan and Luo, 2001) . Gill and Butler (1996) argue that directors need to have attained personal trust between each other, as relying on "procedural" trust, based on the terms of the IJV contract, is not sufficient for enhancing successful inter-partner relations. Such a conclusion is particularly pertinent as studies emphasise that high levels of trust between the board of directors and the IJV CEO, accompanied by a sharing of values and vision for the future, are necessary prerequisites for the IJV to be effective (Garrow et al, 2000) . Thus, positive inter-partner and continuity of board membership is found to be important in maintaining relationships and developing a shared vision between IJV board directors (Bjorkman, 1995; Goodall and Warner, 2002) . In terms of continuity, board tenure encouraging of team cohesion is identified as varying between two and five years (Pearce, 2000; Goodall and Warner, 2002) .
Frequency and Content of Board Meetings
The frequency of board meetings and what could be viewed as a minimal required agenda is often not agreed upon by the partners in the first instance (Schaan, 1988) . Research highlights "a tendency to overlook this most important opportunity to keep significant matters under appropriate review" (Schaan, 1988:7) . Moreover, it has been found (Shenkar and Zeira, 1987) that parent companies tend to disagree not only on the desired extent of autonomy sought by IJVs but also on the frequency of participation of the foreign parents' representatives on IJV board meetings. The majority of IJVs reported in Goodall and Warner's (2002) study of corporate governance in Sino-foreign IJVs, were holding two board meetings per year. Other authors (Daniels and Magill, 1993; Yan and Gray, 1994; Groot and Merchant, 2000) also found that the frequency of IJV board meetings varies between two and four times per year. For example, the board of directors of the four IJVs Yan and Gray (1994) studied met at least twice a year to set annual goals, review performance and approve operational plans for the venture.
In two of the three IJVs studied by Groot and Merchant (2000) , the IJV board met four times per year, and in the third, twice per year. These findings indicate a less than average frequency for full board meetings amongst Anglo American enterprises which occur, on average, seven times a year (Monks and Minnow, 1995) . Nevertheless, the interface between management in the partners' headquarters and the IJV management, through the IJV board of directors, is reported by the parties concerned as being of crucial importance (Daniels and Magill, 1993 ).
Yet such views have to be challenged, for as noted in the corporate governance literature, board members trust of each other's expertise and judgement is critical and such trust is difficult to sustain on boards with low levels of interpersonal interaction (Forbes and Milliken, 1999 ). This point is particularly clearly made in Rogers and Molnar's (1976) study who cite that greater interaction amongst board director colleagues reduces perceptions of role ambiguity, an important consideration where the IJV board fulfils a crucial buffering function between parents and enterprise (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992:71) .
In terms of content, Groot and Merchant (2000:597) provide a description of a typical fourhour board meeting, in one of the IJVs they studied, highlighting the following items; a onehour update on financial results, a short update on capital programmes; half-hour discussion on ongoing and proposed programmes regarding the distribution of IJV products through partner's channels; short discussion on exchange rates and hedging plans, with the rest of the meeting on other strategic issues considered topical. Often studies conclude that comparable agenda items attract the attention of IJV board members, with the time allocated to such items varying according to contextual demands (Yan and Gray, 1994; Goodall and Warner, 2002 ).
Impact of Culture
The impact of national and organisational culture and the significance of the context in which the board is working are identified as important factors determining board effectiveness (Goodall and Warner, 2002 ). Bjorkman's (1995) findings demonstrate one aspect of culture, namely, the importance of resolving contentious issues before Sino-foreign IJV board meetings. Nearly half the respondents in Goodall and Warner's (2002) study noted that the partners would try to reach agreement on critical issues before board meetings. Any remaining contentious issues would be avoided during the meeting itself but then "picked up" later in informal discussions. Amongst certain national cultures, such as that of the Chinese, the importance of informal communication aimed at conflict avoidance at board meetings is a crucial consideration, thus allowing board meetings to formalise agreements already reached (Goodall and Warner, 2002) . Accordingly, Goodall and Warner (2002) conclude that membership of an IJV board in China is not simply a question of selection according to existing business skills but also taking account of cultural concerns in the selection and preparation of potential board members. In particular, cross-cultural training is identified as useful, as well as the selection of people with personalities "which will flourish in a relationship-based business environment" (Goodall and Warner, 2002:89) . They suggest that IJV board members need to come to terms with radically different approaches to analysis and as such, need to learn to listen to each other in order to be aware of contrasting rationales on the board.
IJV TOP TEAMS
Given the importance of IJV TMT processes in determining the success of the IJV, it is striking that only a small number of studies concentrate on IJV TMTs, and their interrelationships (Hambrick et al, 2001 ). Yet, the studies reviewed examining IJV TMT processes (e.g., Pearce, 1997; Hambrick et al, 2001) shed some light on the IJV directors' role and contribution by highlighting the "special property of IJV TMTs that render the literature on TMTs and small groups incomplete" (Hambrick et al, 2001 (Hambrick et al, :1035 . Namely, as members of an 
IJV Board Director
Garrow et al, (2000) have examined how people work effectively within alliances and IJVs, including the skills and behaviour necessary for effective contribution. Their report, based on a number of case studies conducted in IJVs and other alliances, highlights the nature and importance of the role that top executives play in an IJV form of organisation. Although they do not explicitly state which group of people they are referring to in using the term "alliance manager", from their report it becomes clear that they refer to Chairman, CEO and other IJV board members/top executives. They found that, despite the fact that IJVs need clear goals and decision-making processes, there is a danger of "stifling the spirit" of an IJV with too much formalisation of processes and specifying of roles (Garrow et al, 2000:73) . Garrow et al (2000) further identify that certain IJV board directors role model appropriate behaviour and skills in order to minimise political behaviour and promote sharing of information and ideas, thus encouraging a constant revaluation of strategic objectives. "Although the alliance manager may have been chosen from one of the parent companies, it is essential that he/she represents both parties impartially. This is a key part of building trust and forming the basis for the degree of integration necessary" (Garrow et al, 2000:35) . Garrow et al (2000) also suggest that influencing, negotiating and persuading without exercising undue control is an essential requirement for an alliance manager, coupled with excellence in business acumen and strong interpersonal skills. Additional to identifying IJV directors' skills, authors in the HRM field on
IJVs (Schuler and Van Sluijs, 1992; Schuler, 2001 ) have also focused on the criteria for selection and appointment to IJV board/TMT positions. Even so, the majority of studies on senior roles in IJVs concentrate on examining the role of the person in charge of an IJV, namely, the CEO or IJV general manager (GM). Although the term "GM" is, in the majority of cases, used with reference to the person in charge of an IJV (the CEO), the terms "CEO" and "GM" have been adopted by different authors (e.g., Geringer and Frayne, 1990) to identify roles of similar or different managerial levels (Table 2) . Kumar and Seth (1998) provide empirical evidence regarding the activities that IJV board members perform as a part of their role in the control and co-ordination of IJVs. They distinguish between the internal and external roles of board members. The internal role corresponds to participation by IJV board members in strategic planning and performance monitoring processes, particularly in the following four areas: (1) participation in drawing up strategic plans; (2) approval of budgets and short-term plans; (3) monitoring operating performance; and (4) co-ordinating the IJV with the parents (Kumar and Seth, 1998:597) . The external role of the IJV board members concerns involvement in facilitating legal and public/government relations on behalf of the IJV. Kumar and Seth (1998) conclude that with greater strategic interdependence between the IJV and its parents, both the internal and external role of the board members intensify. They also establish that, with increased environmental uncertainty, IJV board members pay greater attention to their external role and therefore have to reconcile the conflicting demands of their two sets of roles (Kumar and Seth, 1998) .
In his comprehensive review of the literature related to HR issues and activities in IJVs,
Schuler (2001) provides a description of the role of the HR director on the IJV board.
According to Schuler (2001) , the HR director plays the dual role of attending to the needs and challenges facing the IJV whilst simultaneously being responsive to the objectives of both partners. To bridge such dualities, displaying capability in negotiation, communications and tolerance is essential. Extrapolating his findings to the role of IJV director, Schuler concludes that displaying concern for multiple sets of stakeholders, knowing how to work with partners to create a win-win situation and seeing the wisdom of mutual sharing over competing between the partners, are important capabilities (Schuler, 2001:44) . Schuler (2001:29) summarises the critical selection criteria for IJV directors, which include: knowledge of the IJV business, parents' strategy, structure and values; knowledge of the local culture, politics, laws, competitors; ability and willingness to learn and encourage transfer of learning; ability to negotiate; understanding of cultural differences; tolerance for conflict and ambiguity. Although this description provides insight concerning the performance expectation of an IJV board member, particularly that of the HR director, Schuler's (2001) contribution is still conceptual
and has yet to be tested empirically. Nevertheless, both Schuler's (2001) and Kumar and Seth's (1998) conclusions are useful in gaining an insight into the nature of an IJV board director's role, the qualities IJV board members should bring to the boardroom and the activities they perform.
Role of an IJV CEO/GM
It has been long recognised that the position of the IJV CEO/GM is critical for the effective management of the IJV, as this is the focal point for the maintenance of relationships with each of the parents, as well as the running of the IJV (Geringer, 1993; Frayne and Geringer, 1993) .
Particularly pertinent is the bridging function of attempting to reconcile differences between the parent companies, by gaining consensus about the IJV vision and presenting that vision to the board of each parent (Garrow et al, 2000) . The influence and formal power of the IJV CEO/GM's position is influenced by the governance (control) structure established by the parents (Geringer and Hebert, 1989:242) . However, although the ability to appoint the IJV CEO/GM increases the chances that the parent's interests will be observed, it is no guarantee that the CEO/GM will always accommodate that parent's preferences (Schaan, 1988:14) . The IJV CEO/GM is identified as being in the position of needing to accommodate the interests of all parents, each with different expectations, whilst finding a balance between the parents' priorities and a compromise between their different sets of objectives (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999 ).
Clearly, the IJV CEO/GM typically requires more extensive contact with each parent enterprise as well as a more explicit and detailed understanding and appreciation of each parent's expectations, than might be the case for the executives of each of the parent companies (Geringer and Hebert, 1991:261) . Accordingly, Li et al (1999) contend that the most important requirements for the IJV CEO/GM are his/her ability to express the vision, values and expectations of the IJV and to have diplomatic competence and skills in cross-cultural understanding and communication.
In their discussion of the role of HR strategies as control mechanisms in IJVs, Geringer and Frayne (1990) identify the skills necessary for the IJV CEO/GM which are to inspire confidence, to motivate staff drawn from different business cultures and to satisfy the oftendivergent interests of the parents. Their study identifies that the main requirements for the IJV CEO/GM include having the personality, vision, leadership and networking skills to win the trust of critical stakeholders. Moreover, as is the case with a number of other authors that focused on the IJV CEO/GM role (Li et al, 1999) , the tendency has been to focus on the more tangible outcomes of the role, at the expense of the actual processes (dynamic nature) entailed in fulfilling the role. Shenkar and Zeira (1992) examine the organisational (the number of parent firms, ownership, parents' dominance and objectives, cultural distance) and personal (length of service, education, autonomy) correlates of role conflict and role ambiguity that face IJV CEOs/GMs.
They establish that an IJV CEO/GM is challenged by the simultaneous demands of the different policy makers in each parent company and of the various employee groups in the IJV, as well as the internal and external stakeholders in the host country and other countries in which the IJV conducts business, and is required to translate these different, ambiguous and conflicting expectations into workable strategies. In support, Garrow et al (2000) find that the IJV CEO/GM devotes considerable time reconciling parental differences, as well as taking care of alliance business. Gong et al (2001) also studied the role conflict and ambiguity of CEOs in
Chinese-based IJVs and conclude that role conflict and ambiguity diminish when the contract between the parents is agreed and clear to all parties concerned. Whatever perspective is taken, all of these studies (Shenkar and Zeira, 1992; Garrow et al, 2000; Gong et al, 2001 ) emphasise the unique and dynamic role processes occurring within IJVs, due to the multiplicity of demands of substantial equity-sharing stakeholders operating within multiple environments. In response to the limitations of previous empirical research in IJVs (Parkhe, 1993) , it is further held that there is a need for studies to focus on theory building rather than theory testing.
CONCLUSION
Qualitative case studies are particularly well suited to new research areas, or research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ghauri et al, 1995) . Additionally, qualitative approaches to IJV research allow for the development of new concepts by gaining deeper understanding of the phenomenon through becoming immersed in the context of IJVs.
Finally, Goodall and Warner (2002) recommend that future research should attempt to gain access to IJV's partners' local and foreign board members in order to gain further insights concerning the challenges and ambiguities faced by IJV board members.
In addition, the paper suggests the following implications for practitioners: 
